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The issues addressed in the article are of particular relevance due to the deepen-
ing anthropological crisis in the current geopolitical situation. The aim of the 
article is to introduce a category of ‘objective being’ into the language of science. 
The used research methods: philosophical reflection, comparative analysis and 
logical-historical integration. The main theoretical and methodological frame-
work for the study is the approach to understanding a human being through the 
system of fundamental human attitudes to the world such as human attitude 
to things (objective being), human attitude to other people (social being) and 
human attitude to the Absolute (eternal universal being). The study is dedicated 
to the analysis of the human objective being and identification of its develop-
ment stages: the stage of immediate relationship with things; the stage of ‘medi-
ated relationship’ when technology becomes a mediating tool; and the stage of 
‘double mediation’, when technology as a tool becomes a necessary precondition 
for the emergence of another mediating tool – cyberspace, potentially containing 
‘curled up’ virtual realities. Such approach allows identifying the contradictions 
between the existential, instrumental and cybernetic spaces, arising in the pro-
cess of the objective being development. Introduction of the category of ‘objective 
being’ as a type of fundamental human relationship to the world into the lan-
guage of science expands the methodological background for the research into 
the vital anthropological issues of our time.
Key words: a human being, attitude to things, existential space, instrumental 
space, cyberspace, man frontiers.
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Introduction
Dynamic development of the subject environment of modern society, the 
movement of the most important forms of life activities (education, work, lei-
sure, services, etc.) from the real sphere to virtual again actualizes research 
into anthropological issues.
The 21st century is marked by changes in the methodology of human stud-
ies. Instead of comprehending the essence of things, in the foreground of the 
research there is disclosure of fundamental attitudes of a human being towards 
the world and oneself. Now the key research objects are fundamental human 
attitudes to the world such as attitudes to things (objective being), attitudes to 
other people (social being) and attitudes to the Absolute (eternal, universal di-
mension of a man being). Fundamental attitudes of a human being towards the 
world constitute the problem field that is conventionally defined as the ‘man in 
the world’. The human attitude to oneself forms the ‘man’s inner world’ or ‘I’. 
The ‘man in the world’ and the ‘man’s inner world’ are methodological concepts 
that represent a human being as an anthropological entity in its ontological 
differences. The ‘man in the world’ and the ‘man’s inner world’ in their inter-
relation form a unity of man’s existential space.1
The objective being2 holds a special place among the fundamental attitudes 
of man in the world, because it is an activity aimed at creating the own specific 
environment for human existence – culture (‘the second nature’). It should be 
noted that the notion of ‘objective being’ here is used in the following mean-
ing: the product of man labour as a result of objectifying man forces, abilities, 
knowledge and skills in the objects of culture. The world of cultural objects 
surrounding a human being is the objectification of human experience and 
knowledge. Every object is a fixation of the human mode of behaviour. Master-
ing each thing created by people means learning how to act and live as a hu-
man. The process of man’s activity is accompanied by constant objectification 
of human forces, abilities, knowledge and skills in the objects of human culture. 
De-objectification, on the contrary, assumes appropriation of objects of culture 
by a human being. The forms of objectification and de-objectification of human 
vital forces have been historically changing.
1 Lubov E. MOTORINA, A Man as Anthropological Integrity: Philosophical Reflection, 
Nova Prisutnost, 15 (2017) 1, 31-46, 39. In more detail about the concept of the author of 
understanding a person as anthropological unity in its ontological differences, see MOTORINA 
L. E. Filosofskaya antropologiya [Philosophical Anthropology]. Moscow, INFRA-M, 2017, 82-
197.
2 The concept of ‘objective being’ is used in the sense of a product of human labour, representing 
the objectification of forces, abilities, knowledge and skills in objects of human culture.
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1. Objective being as immediate man relationship with things
Initially the human attitude to things had a nature of immediate relation-
ship. Although the tools, as man forces objectified in the objects of the cul-
ture created by people (the artificial environment), appear from the moment 
of the start of human labour activities, they do not exist separately, but are 
organically included in human existential space. The things created by hu-
mans were objects of everyday use, and in this case produced for own needs 
and considered appropriate and necessary. Even they were produced for other 
people, the craftsman was proud of being trusted and recognized as a master. 
In Heidegger’s philosophy, such things are defined as companions to human 
life, and the very attitude to such things is called ‘intimate’ – as an attitude to 
something personally invented or personally appropriated.
In his book ‘Being and Time’, Heidegger identifies the initial ontologi-
cal form of ‘equipment’ (das Zeug, which also means a tool or instrument). 
Heidegger defines daily being of human in the world (‘everyday being in-the-
world’) as ‘dealings in the world’, characterised by the phenomenon of ‘care.’3 
In the ‘careful dealings’ man creates tools (‘equipment’), but they are always 
subordinated to the structure of the existential space. Beings encountered in 
taking care Heidegger defines as useful things. Heidegger writes: 
“Strictly speaking, there “is” no such thing as a useful thing. There always be-
longs to the being of a useful thing a totality of useful things in which this 
useful thing can be what it is. A useful thing is essentially “something in order 
to…”. The different kinds of “in order to” such as serviceability, helpfulness, 
usability, handiness, constitute a totality of useful things. The structure of “in 
order to” contains a reference of something to something.”4
In this sense, each thing created by people initially had its own place and 
value. Production of a thing was determined not only by its ‘what-for’ usability 
but also the ‘where-of’ property of its composition. The things were produced 
of natural materials, where the ‘first nature’ was a natural precondition for 
human existence, and the thing revealed its beauty and concealed properties. 
Any produced thing contained ‘an assignment’ to its producer and user. The 
‘work produced’ lived according to the laws of man – its ‘master’. Heidegger de-
fines such existence mode of things (‘equipment’) as ‘handiness.’5 “Handiness 
is the ontological categorial definition of beings as they are “in themselves.”6 
Heidegger emphasises that ‘handiness’, as the constitutional principle of being 
of ‘a totality of useful things’, does not always refer to the individual being, it 
3 Martin HEIDEGGER, Being and Time, Translated by Joan Stambaugh, NY, State University of 
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can also occur in the mass production, but the produced goods should retain 
the property of ‘handiness’ and meet the world in which they are waited by 
users and consumers – the world “which is at the same time our world.”7 As 
emphasized by Heidegger, any produced thing should be ‘handiness’ not only 
in the domestic world of the workshop – it should also remain ‘handiness’ in 
the public world. The most important is that the man-made things reveal the 
‘surrounding world of nature.’8 
Thus, based on the research findings by M. Heidegger, we can conclude that 
the human attitude to the world of things at the first stage of the development 
of human objective being has a nature of immediate relationship. Everything 
(even the goods produced as tools) is part of the unified existential space. The 
world of the man-made things exists as ‘a totality of useful things’, representing 
the ‘second nature’ (culture), which is organically linked to the ‘first nature’ and 
develops on the basis of personal principle. In this case, the produced things 
always contain a positive value-defined meaning. 
2. The stage of ‘mediated relationship’ with things
However, the situation was gradually changing, and people started losing 
control of the things created by them. The things began to exist and function 
according to laws of commodity production and market. That was the start of 
a new relationship between a human being and the world; ‘a totality of useful 
things’ ceases to be ‘handiness’ for man. Objectifying own vital forces, people 
gradually ceased to possess things as something personal, inherently human, 
because the man-made things no longer belonged to them. The things and the 
human forces objectified in them acquired their independent existence. Rather 
than just a companion to man life, the thing became a tool, having not only a 
positive meaning and ‘meaningful value’ but also generating negative conse-
quences threatening human existence. Man was no longer facing threat only 
from the ‘first nature’, but also from the ‘second’ (culture), which was intended 
to protect humans. The instrumental space emerged as a self-functioning 
phenomenon of culture (the second nature). That stage of the development of 
human objective being began from the start of industrial production of ma-
chinery (‘equipment’), and the ‘first nature’, which used to be the condition of 
human existence, also became ‘equipment’ after was included in the produc-
tion process. This new type of relationship is characterized by the destruction 
of an integral existential space, which is broken into two worlds: instrumental 
and existential. The instrumental world (industrially produced machinery) has 
7 Ibid., 71.
8 Ibidem.
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dual nature: results of man activity still have a positive meaning but begin 
posing threat and risks for Man.
The purpose of human activities changes from overcoming daily deficiencies 
and seeking protection from the elemental forces of nature to actively using and 
transforming the surrounding world for the own needs. The transforming and 
consuming component of human objective being literally ‘overwhelms’ man, 
and gradually it becomes unimportant for people whether the goals of man ac-
tivities coincide with the goals and tasks of the world itself. This phenomenon 
is pointed out by I. Kant.9 He emphasizes that a human being is under the illu-
sion that the world seems to exist only to be cognized and transformed. Yet the 
world has its own goals, and, in order to comprehend them, a human should 
learn to ‘ask the world the right questions’, trying to discover the goals of the 
world.10 The most comprehensive analysis of the role of technologies in the life 
of modern human is made in the works by S.L. Frank, N.A. Berdyaev, M. Hei-
degger, K. Jaspers and other major thinkers of the 20th century. They revealed 
and uncovered important aspects related to the interpretation of technology 
as a phenomenon that caused significant changes in the relationship between 
human and the world. The philosophers especially focused on the analysis of 
the ‘duality of technology’ caused by the contradiction between the creative 
nature of a human being and the results of human creative activities. Z. Freud 
in his work ‘Discontent in Culture’ states that this contradiction is fatal for the 
history of mankind.11
Exploring the dual nature of the technology, Jaspers notes that technology 
distances us from nature and brings us closer to it at the same time, because it 
allows us to discover previously unknown properties of the world and develop 
our own abilities.12 In other words, technology, on the one hand, contributes 
to man’s self-development and self-realization but, on the other hand, it re-
duces the level of controllability of the so-called instrumental space. Jaspers 
considers that the main threats for man are ‘spiritual emptiness’13 and ‘loss of 
the meaning of life’. To existentially experience and more deeply comprehend 
the degree of this threat, we’d like to quote here from the book ‘The Downfall 
of Idols’ by Russian religious philosopher S.L. Frank, posing questions worth 
reflecting upon. He wrote:
9 See Lubov E. MOTORINA, Kant’s Anthropology as a Coherent Doctrine of Man, Studia 
philosophica kantiana, 2 (2017) 20-30.
10 Immanuel KANT, Kritika chistogo razuma [The Critique of Pure Mind], Immanuel KANT, 
Sochineniya v 6 tomah [Works in 6 Volumes]. Moscow, Mysl, 1964, V. 3, 84.
11 Siegmund FREUD, Nedovolstvo v kulture [Discontent in Culture], Filosofskie nauki, 1 (1989) 
94-100, 100.
12 Karl JASPERS, Smysl i naznachenie istorii [The Origin and Goal of History], Moscow, Politizdat, 
1991, 118-128.
13 Ibid., 138.
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”We are not happy any more with the progress of science and the development 
of technology associated with it. Travelling by air – this avian flight which man 
had been dreaming of for centuries – has already become almost a routine, 
ordinary way of travel. Yet what is it for if you do not know where and why 
to fly, if the same boredom and a hopeless spiritual weakness and emptiness 
reign all over the world? (…) The general development of industrial technology, 
accumulation of wealth, improvement of the external conditions of life – all 
these things are good and definitely, necessary, but isn’t there some kind of 
hopeless Sisyphean labour in all that (…)? Is that young, naive faith with which 
generations of people worked to accumulate wealth and develop production, 
considering that to be the means to achieve some joyful final goal, still possible 
today? And is this unlimited accumulation and transformation of a man being 
into a slave of things, machines, telephones and all other sorts of dead results of 
human activity really necessary for happiness?”14
M. Heidegger also writes about the contradictory nature of technology, 
which is reflected in his notion of Ge-stell (‘enframing’) – a way of revealing 
the concealed properties of the world, the phenomenon in which the essence 
of modern technology manifests itself. Therefore, he considers technology to 
be one of the ways to expand human creative possibilities. In accordance with 
philosophy of M. Heidegger revealing the concealed properties of the world 
goes in two ways: a way of poetic (‘bringing-forth’) and a way of production 
(‘challenging-forth’). He identifies two modes of revealing: productive (instru-
mental) and poetic (existential). “The challenging revealing has its origin as a 
destining in bringing-forth.”15 The expansion of the first of them, in his opinion, 
leads to the loss of the second, and people gradually lose their inherent ability 
of revealing the concealed properties of the world. Technology, according to 
Heidegger, is the destiny of man, and he considers destining in the Ge-stell 
mode (productive and enframing approach to revealing the concealed proper-
ties of the world) to be the supreme danger. He reiterates that the danger does 
not lie in the negative consequences of technological development themselves. 
The most serious, danger is caused by the fact that people are not ready for such 
transformation of the world. According to Heidegger, people have to develop 
relations with the world in accordance with the essence of technology, its dual 
nature. 
Thus, based on the research findings by M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers and S.L. 
Frank, we can come to the following conclusion: while the prevailing compo-
nent at the first stage of the objective world development was being protected 
from the elemental forces of nature through strengthening and expansion of 
human capabilities, the stage of the mediated man’s relationship with the world 
14 Semyon L. FRANK, Sochineniya [Works], Moscow, Pravda, 1990, 139.
15 Martin HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, Translated and with an Introduction by William Lovitt, 
NY&London, Garland Publishing Inc., 1977, 29-30.
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of things is characterised by the dominating component of risk or threat – a 
threat of not only physical destruction, but also of the destruction of morals 
and values. The gap between the existential space and the instrumental space 
is widening.
The instrumental world exerts more and more pressure on the man’s ex-
istential space. Such concern was expressed at the end of the 20th century by 
French sociologist A. Touraine. He emphasizes that the ties between personal 
freedom and social effectiveness are breaking down in the modern society; 
culture and economy – the symbolic world and the instrumental world – are 
becoming more and more divided. Therefore, A. Touraine raises a question 
whether we can remain human or let us be torn apart between the universe 
of instrumentality and the universal identity.16 Expansion of the instrumental 
space significantly narrows, distorts and sometimes destroys the existential 
space. The personal principle in culture is increasingly replaced with its sys-
temic foundations. Culture, as the objectified creative power of man, which was 
initially protecting it from the elements of nature, now itself gradually turns 
into an element raging within the culture. A systemic, anonymous, interchange-
able man more and more prevails in the modern culture. ‘I’ is today dissolving 
in ‘It’, and personality encounters the impersonal world. The loss of the value of 
a separate individual and the personal principle in culture, its transition to im-
personal systemic foundations poses important worldview questions for man. 
What kind of super-individual structure will become bearer of such personal 
qualities as responsibility, conscience, sense of duty, dignity and others, with-
out which the life of mankind is inconceivable? Is a personal meaning possible 
in an impersonal anonymous culture? And is it possible to continue creating 
(objectifying oneself) in such culture, having lost the personal meaning? These 
questions remain unanswered so far. 
3. The stage of ‘double mediation’
That next stage of the development of human objective being, characterised 
by some specific properties, we define as the stage of ‘double mediation’; it is 
related to the emergence of the ‘third nature’ – a new phenomenon which is 
called virtual reality. A turning point in the emergence and study of virtual 
reality was the appearance of computers as a new means of objective world 
construction. From the point of view of everyday occurrence, the appearance 
of computers looked like the emergence of a new reality, a new thing and its 
associated range of values, i.e. computers have become a tool of evidence for 
a new reality, namely computer virtual reality pointed to new meanings and 
16 See Alain TOURAINE, Can We Live Together: Equality and Differences, Translated by David 
Macey. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, 336.
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life practices that until now people did not know. Famous Spanish researcher 
of modern civilization processes M. Castells noted that the concept of com-
puter virtual reality turned out to be the key in comprehending the meaning 
of the information age both as a whole and in all its aspects: social, political, 
technological, etc. He points to a new phase development of a society in which 
identities washed away and virtuality recognized as an integral and essential 
attribute of the new world order.17
The meaning behind the concept of virtual reality remains unclear, blurred, 
not clarified in any conventional way. One can argue only the fact of wide 
interdisciplinary research of this phenomenon, which is quite perspective at 
this stage. As for the philosophical comprehending of the phenomenon, until 
it received an unequivocal holistic conceptual lighting, although it is actively 
discussed in the philosophical literature.18
Many scholars mention paradoxicality as a characteristic feature of virtual 
reality. The essence of the paradox lies in the fact that virtual reality is not an 
objective entity in the full meaning of the word, because it is supported by the 
activity of the generated technical environment.19 Therefore, today the most 
vital research issue is the ontology of virtual reality. The scholars working in 
this research area look for answers to several questions. Does virtual reality 
exist actually or potentially? Is it a state of human consciousness or a part of 
objective being? If it is a part of objective being, what form does it take (an 
independent reality or a phenomenon supported by the technical environment 
generating it)? Can it be considered as a part of culture (second nature) or a 
medium constructing a new artificial world (third nature)? These questions 
need to be developed as a methodological basis for their further research. 
For now, directly opposite points of view are expressed on the ontology of 
virtual reality. So, S.S. Horuzhij accentuates the problem of ontology of virtual 
reality based on the categories of Aristotle: opportunity, potentiality, energy, 
actualization, implementation, etc., and concludes that the virtual reality is not 
17 Manuel CASTELLS, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, Vol. III. Oxford, 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 488.
18 See Nikolai A. NOSOV, Manifest virtualistiki [The Manifesto of Virtualistics], Moscow, Put., 
2001; Georgii I. RUZAVIN, Virtual’nost’ [Virtuality], Novaya filosofskaya ehnciklopediya 
[New Philosophical Encyclopaedia] in 4 volumes, Moscow, Infra-M, 2010, Vol. 1; Ekaterina E. 
TARATUTA, Filosofiya virtual’noj real’nosti [The Philosophy of Virtual Reality], St Petersburg, 
SPbGU, 2007; Sergei S. HORUZHIJ, O starom i novom [On Old and New], St Petersburg, 
Aleteia, 2000; Lyudmila BAEVA, Virtualizaciya zhiznennogo prostranstva cheloveka i 
problemy internet-igrovoj zavisimosti (IGD) [Virtualization of human life space and problems 
of internet gaming dependence (IGD)], Filosofskie problemy informacionnyh tekhnologij i 
kiberprostranstva, 1(11) (2016), 7-19.
19 Irina V. СVYK, Filosofskie problemy ‘iskusstvennogo intellekta’ i virtual’noj real’nosti, 
[Philosophical Problems of ‘Artificial Intelligence’ and Virtual Reality], Istoriya i filosofiya 
nauki, Pod red. Yu.V. Kryaneva, L.E. Motorinoj [History and Philosophy of Science, Ed. by 
Yu.V. Kryanev, L.E. Motorina], Moscow, ИНФРА-M, 2016, 259.
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Aristotle reality.20 In his opinion virtual reality is like under-exposed, not-born 
being. In future S.S. Horuzhij predicts virtual reality as a departure from real-
ity in some ontologically independent sphere separated from the main reality. 
On the contrary N.A. Nosov asserts the ontological independence of virtual 
reality speaking of its multi-level organization, polyonticity. He considers gen-
eration and interactivity to be specific features. According to him the objects 
of virtual reality are generated by the objects of a different level but interacting 
with the reality generating them.21
Thus, speaking about the specifics of virtual reality, it is necessary to note 
the following: on the one hand, virtual reality has the properties of actual re-
ality (space, time, movement, development, reflection, etc.), but, on the other 
hand, it has virtual-specific properties (technological generation, incorporeal 
objectness, polysemy, autonomy, interactivity, etc.). If we consider the etymol-
ogy of the term ‘virtuality’, we can see the duality in the ontological status of 
virtual reality. 
The term ‘virtual’ has been used since ancient times. Aristotle already in-
troduced categories of possible and actual to denote things in possibility and 
things in actuality. In the ontology of Thomas Aquinas, the term is used when 
considering the antithesis of potential (possible) and actual (real). Nicholas of 
Cusa in his work ‘On the Vision of God’ considers virtuality as a potential, us-
ing the image of a seed of a tree that potentially contains the tree itself. Thus, 
the term ‘virtual reality’ originally meant the reality that could exist both in the 
state of a potential (possibility) and in the state of actually existing and acting. 
While in the example of a seed and a tree (used by Nicholas of Cusa) the po-
tential had the form of natural givenness (first nature), the potential in the case 
of virtual reality exists as a sphere of interaction between a human being and 
technology (technosphere). In this case the virtual reality can be considered as 
a part of human objective being, part of culture and the man-made artificial 
environment. However, this part of human objective being has its own specific 
features. While at the previous stage of the objective being development the 
emergence of industrial production technology led to the emergence of its new 
form – mediated being, the emergence of virtual reality gave rise to a situation 
of double mediation, because in this case the technical environment as a means 
in the structure of objective being itself is a condition for the generation of a 
new kind of mediating tool – cyberspace. Cyberspace is a form of actualization 
of virtual reality; it is a complex global computer network, in which virtual 
realities exist in a curled form.
20 Sergei S. HORUZHIJ, O starom i novom [On Old and New], St Petersburg, Aleteia, 2000, 311-
339.
21 Ekaterina E. TARATUTA, Filosofiya virtual’noj real’nosti [The Philosophy of Virtual Reality], 
St Petersburg, SPbGU, 2007, 60.
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Cyberspace is a metaphorical abstraction that came to science from science 
fiction literature (William Gibson) and used in philosophy and computer sci-
ence to refer to events and the database of computer and computer networks. 
Such events do not occur in cities and countries where participants or servers 
are located, and different countries laws are not applicable to them. Cyberspace 
is considered in this context as something single, integral and impersonal, as 
the internal phenomenon of information networks which is a virtual reality in 
a curled form. In that sense it is an example of double mediation. According 
to M. Castells it fits into the new nascent order of ‘space of flows’ and ‘timeless 
time’.22
The virtual reality, including many ontologically independent realities, is 
their modelling simulation, and the virtual reality is modelled in accordance 
with the existential space needs. Hence, on the one hand, virtual reality ex-
acerbates the problems of personal self-identification, but, on the other hand, 
it completely removes them, making an individual almost indifferent to its 
personal material reality. The decreased interest in actual reality strengthens 
man’s dependence on virtual reality. Many experts in this field consider that 
the development of virtual reality has no technological limitations. The only 
problem imposing restrictions on the development of virtual reality is, in their 
opinion, the ability of man’s psyche to maintain its authenticity.23 As we can 
see, the problem of man in terms of protecting the personal principle in the 
development of culture (especially its objective component) again returns to 
the centre of the problem field of philosophical reflection.
Conclusion 
So, we can identify three stages of the development of human objective be-
ing: the stage of immediate relationship with things, characterised by the ho-
listic existential space, where man-made objects represent ‘a totality of useful 
things’ and have the property of ‘handiness’ and are organically included in the 
holistic space; the stage of the mediated man’s relationship with the world of 
things, characterized by the destruction of an integral existential space, which 
is broken into two worlds: instrumental space and existential space, with the 
former having a destructive impact on the latter; and the stage of double media-
tion, when the existential space itself is questioned. The peculiarity of the stage 
of double mediation is that the technical environment is a condition for the 
generation of objective being. A contradiction emerges between the existential, 
instrumental and cybernetic spaces. This contradiction remains insufficiently 
22 See Manuel CASTELLS, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, Vol. I. Oxford, 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 407-500.
23 See Richard S. LAZARUS, Emotion and Adaptation, N.Y., Oxford University Press, 1991.
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studied. Introduction of the category of ‘objective being’, as an important 
component of understanding a human being as an anthropological entity, into 
the language of science and identification of the objective being development 
stages, including the stage of double mediation, expands the methodological 
background for the research into the vital anthropological issues of our time.
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Čovjekov odnos prema stvarima: Objektivni bitak
Sažetak
Teme koje su obrađene u ovom članku od posebne su važnosti uslijed sve veće 
antropološke krize u trenutnoj geopolitičkoj situaciji. Cilj ovog članka je uvesti 
kategoriju »objektivnog bitka« u jezik znanosti. Korištene istraživačke metode 
su: filozofska refleksija, komparativna analiza i logičko-povijesna integracija. 
Glavni teoretski i metodološki okvir je pristup razumijevanju ljudskog bića 
kroz sustav temeljnog ljudskog odnosa prema svijetu shvaćenom kao ljudski 
odnos prema stvarima (objektivni bitak), ljudski odnos prema drugim ljudima 
(društveni bitak) i ljudski odnos prema Apsolutnom (vječni univerzalni bitak). 
Istraživanje je posvećeno analizi ljudskog objektivnog bitka i identifikaciji nje-
govih razvojnih faza: faza neposrednog odnosa sa stvarima; stadij »posredo-
vanog odnosa«, kada tehnologija postaje oruđe medijacije; i stadij »dvostrukog 
posredovanja«, kada tehnologija, kao oruđe, postaje nužni preduvjet za nastaja-
nje drugih posredujućih oruđa – cyberspace, koji potencijalno sadrži »uvijenu 
(curled-up)« virtualnu stvarnost. Ovakav pristup nam omogućuje da identifi-
ciramo proturječje između egzistencijalnog, instrumentalnog i kibernetičkog 
prostora, koje izbija u procesu razvoja objektivnog bitka. Uvođenje kategorije 
»objektivnog bitka« kao tipa temeljnog ljudskog odnosa sa svijetom u kategorije 
jezika znanosti proširuje metodološku pozadinu za istraživanje vitalnih antro-
poloških stvarnosti našega vremena.
Ključne riječi: ljudsko biće, odnos prema stvarima, egzistencijalni prostor, in-
strumentalni prostor, cyberspace, granice ljudskoga.
(na hrv. prev. Pavle Mijović)
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